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This article discusses several policy options in the fields of education, research, and innovation 
that are likely to have beneficial, neutral, or negative effects on overall welfare in the 
Netherlands. For some options, the effects are unknown. Beneficial education policies are, for 
instance, policies aimed at increasing teachers' quality and early childhood education programs. 
Additional R&D tax credits for new firms have favourable effects on innovation. A further 
increase in the research incentives to universities is expected to raise scientific output. 
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1  Introduction 
Knowledge policy is widely considered to be an important subject. The Dutch government 
conducts intensive policy on the foundations of the knowledge economy: education, research 
and innovation. In the literature and in policy circles, proposals for additional knowledge 
policies or reforms of existing policies are currently being discussed. Examples are the 
Knowledge Investment Agenda of the Innovation Platform, new innovation policies of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, an advice of the Council of Economic Advisors about research, 
education and entrepreneurship and an advice of the Education Council. 
 
Little is known, however, about the effects of all these policies. The question whether 
knowledge policy works remains difficult to answer. Despite much research effort in the past 
decades, the manner in which the creation and application of knowledge comes about and the 
way policy can influence that process are still not well understood. It is difficult, therefore, to 
form a good judgement about the optimal size and form of knowledge policy. 
 
During the last decades, important progress has been made in the international literature. New 
ways of empirical research into the effectiveness of various types of knowledge policy prove 
very valuable. Examples are the application of new micro-econometric techniques and the use 
of experiments or situations that, often by coincidence, happen to resemble experiments. These 
new methods have proven to be particularly fruitful in the field of education. 
1.1  Contribution of this paper 
This report uses these new insights to contribute to the Dutch policy discussion. For several 
policy areas within the fields of education, research and innovation, we indicate what 
information is available in the international literature and which conclusions may be drawn 
based on this information.  
 
The proposals we discuss always consist of a relatively modest change in current policy. For 
example, we do not discuss the contribution to welfare of publicly financed education as a 
whole, but only of a change in certain aspects of it, or of a modest shift towards private 
financing. The judgement of the proposals is always made conditional on current policy. For 
example, if a lot of policy has already been implemented in a certain area, additional policy may 
be less effective. Also, if we conclude that a certain policy option is likely to have a beneficial 
effect on overall welfare, this conclusion only applies to a modest application of that policy. 
The paper does not make any judgement about large changes in policy. 
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The paper certainly does not discuss all possible policy options. The report focuses on options 
that currently play an important role in the Dutch policy debate and of which convincing 
evaluations are available in the international empirical literature. This paper, therefore, only 
deals with policy options about which experience has already been gained in the past. It does 
not discuss possible new policy options. 
1.2  Much still unknown 
The uncertainty about the effect of additional knowledge policy is still great. Relatively, a lot of 
information is based on research on policies abroad. Beforehand, it is not clear if these policies 
would lead to the same results in the Netherlands, for several reasons. Firstly, the socio-
economic circumstances abroad are often different from those in the Netherlands. 
Secondly, there are differences in the degree to which countries already have introduced 
various policies. The effectiveness of a certain policy instrument may decrease as more and 
more resources are spent on that instrument. If the introduction of a certain policy in a certain 
country has demonstrably positive effects, it does not follow automatically that an expansion of 
that policy in another country that already has implemented this policy is also useful. 
In addition, policy proposals being considered in the Netherlands are almost never identical 
to those abroad. Seemingly small differences in the execution of the same policy idea can create 
important differences in outcomes. “The devil is in the details”, is a very appropriate saying 
when designing (knowledge) policy. 
 
In the area of education, these problems are partly reduced because more studies become 
available that find similar results despite different circumstances and because an increasing 
amount of Dutch research exists. As a result, a reasonably convincing judgement can be made 
about the likeliness of success of policy in this field. Convincing judgements of policies aimed 
at promoting research and innovation can less often be made. 
2  Methodology 
When discussing the various policy options, we organise the available information about the 
expected outcomes via the following three criteria: 
 
•  Social return of the policy objective: What are the effects of reaching the policy objective on 
welfare? 
•  Effectiveness: To which degree does the actual policy instrument indeed generate additional 
social benefits?  
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•  Cost - benefit ratio: How does the expected social costs associated with the policy instrument 
compare to the social benefits? 
 
We call a policy instrument potentially successful if there are strong indications that the policy 
objective raises overall welfare and that the specific policy instrument indeed reaches that 
objective at a favourable cost - benefit ratio. If the policy objective does not raise welfare in the 
first place, or if the policy instrument fails to reach its objective or only at a relatively high cost, 
we call the instrument unlikely to be beneficial. If the instrument on balance does not affect 
welfare much, we give it the judgement neutral. If insufficient information exists to draw well-
founded conclusions, we give the verdict: effect unknown. 
 
When calculating the cost of policy, it is important to include all costs. The total cost is often 
substantially higher than the amount of money that is needed to execute the policy. For 
instance, the cost of a policy that provides subsidies is considerably higher than the amount of 
subsidies paid out. First, there are the costs of developing and executing of the policy. Second, 
there are cost of inefficiencies associated with taxation. These can be substantial, about 15% to 
35% of the tax collected. Third, subsidies may lead to lobbying activities that may be socially 
costly, due to the resources devoted directly to the lobbying activities and due to possible 
socially undesirable effects on the policy process. 
 
2.1  Empirics dominant angle 
To make judgements about the three criteria above, we use three kinds of information: 
 
•  Indicator studies. These are studies which compare Dutch performance and costs in education, 
research and innovation with those of other countries based on certain indicators. 
•  Theoretical arguments about the effects of policy 
•  Empirical studies about the effects of policy 
 
The three kinds of information complement each other. Indicator studies are a useful starting 
point for a diagnosis of how the Netherlands is faring compared to other countries and which 
policy topics may be usefully subjected to further analysis. Each country tries to conduct 
optimal policy given their specific economic, historical and political background. Differences in 
approach and outcome can supply interesting and useful information about possible directions 
for Dutch policy. 
 
Theoretical arguments are valuable to understand how education, research and innovation 
systems work and to indicate where and why the government can usefully intervene. The  
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arguments can, therefore, help to interpret empirical information. However, theoretical 
arguments mostly indicate that under several circumstances certain effects may be expected. In 
order to judge whether a theory correctly represents reality, empirical validation is necessary. In 
addition, theory often points to different mechanisms that can augment or counteract each other. 
The determination of the overall effects is, therefore, almost always an empirical matter, even if 
the theoretical arguments by themselves are sound. 
 
Although indicator studies, theoretical arguments and empirical research about the effects of 
policy are all useful and indeed being used, the results of empirical studies form the dominant 
approach in this paper. The central question is what empirical research tells us about the 
relevance of the various policy objectives for welfare, about the effectiveness and the cost - 
benefit ratio of introducing or intensifying specific policy instruments, given the current policy 
mix in the Netherlands. 
 
2.2  Preference for experiments and for Dutch studies 
It is important to remark that not all empirical studies are equally convincing. Empirical 
research is fraught with pitfalls, and the manner in which a study is designed is of great 
importance to its persuasiveness. Probably, the most important pitfall is the fact that the finding 
of a correlation between the introduction of a particular policy and a certain outcome does not 
tell us anything about the causal nature of that correlation. For instance, suppose that empirical 
studies find that companies that receive relatively much R&D subsidy also invest relatively 
much in R&D. This does not mean that R&D subsidies are effective in promoting R&D 
investment. It could also be the case that the subsidy has no effect on investment al all. The 
cause of the positive correlation could simply be that firms who inherently invest much in R&D 
also receive a large share of the R&D subsidy because it is much easier for them to apply and 
qualify for the subsidy. In this case, the causal relationship between the receipt of subsidies and 
investment in R&D is the opposite of the one assumed by policy makers. 
 
This problem of a possible reverse causation plagues many empirical studies. The best method 
to deal with this problem is to conduct an experiment in which policy is applied at random on a 
limited number of firms or people. In the case of an R&D subsidy, a certain group of firms 
would be identified, and the subsidy would randomly be given to a limited number of them. If it 
turns out that the firms that received the subsidy increase their R&D investment more than the 
other firms, it is very likely that the subsidy indeed raises R&D investment. As stated above, 
studies that use experiments occur more often. In this paper, the results of those studies are 
given a lot of weight. 
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In addition, we give more weight to studies that are performed in the Netherlands, because it is 
not clear whether policy measures will have the same effects in different countries. 
Unfortunately, in many cases there are not enough convincing Dutch studies available for a 
solid evaluation of Dutch policy. Therefore, this paper is based also, and sometimes even 
mostly, on studies performed abroad. 
3  How does the Netherlands compare? 
Dutch students perform well on internationally comparable tests and often find a job after 
leaving school. Spending on education by the government and by students and their parents is 
relatively low. Dutch students leave school at a relatively early age on average, and dropping 
out of school occurs relatively frequently. The level of education of the population is low 
relative to other rich countries.  
 
Indicators of the Dutch research and innovation system also paint a mixed picture of relative 
performance and cost. The Netherlands does not perform systematically better or worse than 
other countries, such as the US, the Scandinavian countries or neighbouring countries. The 
Netherlands performs well on the number and quality of scientific publications. Dutch 
companies generate a lot of patents. However, the cost of scientific publications is high, and the 
service sector creates relatively few innovative products as a share of total sales. 
 
A main issue for further attention in the area of innovation is the low private R&D spending as 
a percentage of GDP. In the area of education, the relatively high drop out rate is remarkable 
and an issue of concern. 
4  Potentially successful education policies 
Education is a crucial factor in the knowledge economy, for the individual and for the whole 
community. Empirical research shows that countries with a better educated labour force 
produce more. An increase in the average education level by one year is estimated to yield 
about 8% more production. Also, one additional year of education raises individuals’ life time 
earnings on average by 5% to 10%. In addition, there are returns in the areas of health, safety 
and the environment. This makes clear that an increase in the level and quality of education in 
the Netherlands may raise welfare. It also explains the great importance the government 
attaches to a good education system and the central role of the government in financing and 
implementing education. 
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Is there, given the current level of government education policy, still a role for additional policy 
measures? The answer is yes. Recent economic research provides solid evidence for the 
importance of good teachers in education. Raising teacher quality can generate high social 
benefits. In addition, empirical research shows that early childhood education, especially for 
young children who have fallen behind, can generate high benefits for society as a whole. Early 
childhood education raises the chances for success in later education. Also, early investment in 
education of children who are potentially lagging behind reduce the dependence on welfare 
programs later on, and increases public safety and social cohesion. The same is true for 
investments that help young people get a so-called starters diploma (the level of education 
minimally needed to successfully enter the labour market).  
 
Recent empirical research does not paint a uniform picture of the marginal social return to 
higher education. The consensus view at the moment is that the social return of higher 
education is about equal to the private return, at the current level of subsidies for higher 
education. Studies exist, however, that find higher social returns. 
 
In light of this role for the government, we judge the potential for success of a number of policy 
options in education. This judgement is based on empirical research, especially solid empirical 
research with proper control groups. 
 
The first potentially successful option is raising teacher quality. Research shows that raising 
teacher quality can lead to substantial improvement in student performance. Solid evidence is 
provided in a recent study in which half a million students in the US state of Texas were 
followed for several years (Rivkin et al., 2005). Repeated observations of the same students 
allow for a very precise determination of the contributions of the teacher and of the school. The 
results show that large differences exist between the contributions of teachers to student 
performance. Improving teacher quality, therefore, can lead to better performance of the 
students.  
How can policy contribute to teacher quality? The current institutional setting in education 
contain few incentives geared towards raising teacher quality, so that potential benefits to 
society may remain underused. Teacher salaries are mostly determined by tenure, and much less 
by performance. Recent studies that use proper control groups show that continued education 
for teachers and financial performance incentives are potentially successful means to raise 
teacher quality and performance at relatively low cost (Angrist and Lavy, 2001; Lavy, 2002). 
No hard empirical evidence is yet available about the effectiveness of other possible policy 
options in this area. 
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A second potentially successful option is early and pre-school education aimed at students at 
risk. In the US, several projects have been carried out with children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. By lottery, it was determined which children were allowed to participate in 
educational programs and which were not. The experiences of these children in and after school 
were followed, sometimes even for 30 years. The results show that this type of education policy 
has large social benefits (Currie, 2001). These benefits consist of improvement in the 
opportunities for employment and reduction in criminal activity. 
 
A third potentially successful option is reducing early drop out from school. Reduced early drop 
out reduces the dependence on welfare programs later on and the likelihood of criminal 
behaviour. Taking stock of studies with an experimental design (including proper control 
groups) shows two promising directions. First, projects that use financial incentives for 
students, teachers and schools prove to be effective. Positive experiences have been gained in 
the UK, the US and Israel (Cunha et al., 2005; Angrist and Lavy, 2004; Lavy, 2002; Dearden et 
al., 2005). Second, promising results have been achieved by long-lasting and intensive 
programs with coaches, aimed at the social development of students at risk (Dynarski et al., 
1998; Heckman, 2000).  
 
A fourth potentially successful option is implementing a social loan program for higher 
education. The main purpose of a social loan program is improving the efficiency of the use of 
public funds in higher education. In addition, it will increase the flexibility of student financing 
of higher education. This may, for instance, be useful if tuition levels will be allowed to vary 
more in the future, for example to pay for education programs with a higher quality. A social 
loan program makes it possible to further apply the principle of letting the beneficiary pay, 
without reducing access to higher education.  
In the current system of financing higher education, many subsidies aim to guarantee 
universal access to higher education. Student loans are more efficient for this purpose than 
subsidies, such as student grants. In Australia, a social loan program was introduced in 1989 
called the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS). Before the introduction of HECS, 
there were no private contributions to higher education in Australia. Through HECS, the private 
contribution rose to 23% of the average direct cost. Various evaluation studies show that 
participation in higher education did not fall after the introduction of HECS (for a survey, see 
CPB, 2001). 
Two remarks are in order, however. Recent US research (Field, 2006) points to loan 
aversion among students. If loan aversion is also relevant in the Netherlands, subsidy elements 
in the financing of higher education may still be in order, for instance for disadvantaged groups. 
Second, there is a lot of uncertainty about the social returns of education. As a result, the 
optimal level of public subsidies for higher education is difficult to quantify.  
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A policy option with the judgement ‘neutral’ concerns additional subsidies for ‘Life-long 
learning’. The evidence is mixed as to whether additional subsidies lead to additional schooling. 
An education tax deduction for employees 40 years of age and older in the Netherlands turned 
out to result only in a postponement of participation in education (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 
2004). By contrast, a recent Dutch study found that the education tax deduction for employees 
does lead to more schooling (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2006). It is also relevant that the private 
sector has already developed institutions to help employees get more education, such as funds 
set up by certain industries. 
 
The policy option that allows private institutions to enter the higher education market on a level 
playing field with the current publicly financed institutions gets the verdict ‘effect unknown’. 
The goal here is to bring about a better match between demand and supply of higher education 
and to improve its efficiency and innovation. The empirical literature gives some support for a 
positive effect of competition among suppliers of education on the performance of students (for 
a survey, see burger et al., 2004), but the studies only cover primary and secondary education 
abroad. It is not clear whether the results may be applied to higher education in the Netherlands. 
In addition, the literature points to several disadvantages such as more segregation. Opening up 
the higher education market to new suppliers touches on many aspects of the organization of 
higher education, such as the level of tuition, selective admission and the profit motive. It is  
difficult to assess the welfare effects of all these aspects. Exploring promising elements on a 
small scale, such as the current experiments with differentiation of tuition levels and selective 
admission, seems a sensible approach. 
 
A number of policy options are not likely to be beneficial. Decreasing class-size is not likely to 
improve welfare, because a relatively small improvement in student performance is 
counterbalanced by very high costs. In the past several years, several studies of the effects of 
reducing class-size have been carried out based on experiments with proper control groups. The 
most well-known is the Star-experiment in the US state of Tennessee, where students and 
teachers were randomly assigned to small and big classes (Krueger, 1999). In addition, several 
studies were done based on so-called natural experiments. In these cases, class sizes varied by 
coincidence, for instance because of cost rules (see, for instance, Angrist and Lavy, 1999). In 
general, a reduction in class-size is found to lead to a small improvement in learning 
achievements. A Dutch study, however, found no effect of class-size on student performance 
(Dobbelsteen et al., 2002). Reducing class-size, however, is very expensive, as it requires many 
more teachers. Since there is already a projection of a teacher shortage, reducing class-size may 
increase bottlenecks and costs for schools in hiring teachers. 
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Policies designed to increase the number of science graduates are also not likely to succeed. The 
goal of these policies is to boost R&D investment in the Netherlands. An increase in R&D 
indeed raises welfare because private companies generally invest less in R&D than is socially 
desirable. However, stimulating enrolment in science education does not appear to be an 
effective instrument for promoting R&D. Over half of the science graduates does not end up 
working in an R&D job. In addition, there does not appear to be a shortage of science graduates. 
Several indicators of the labour market, such as the number of vacancies, the relative level of 
wages and the labour participation rate do not point to such a shortage. Increasing the number 
of science graduates is not helpful if there already enough of them. Moreover, supply of foreign 
science graduates is also available (see also, Freeman, 2005).  
More generally, there is no empirical evidence that supports a causal link between the 
supply of science graduates and the amount of R&D investment. And there is no solid evidence 
that shows that government policies currently in place to promote science education indeed 
raise the number of science graduates. 
 
Based on the empirical literature, there is also little support for expanding the use of computers 
and ICT in education. Four of the five solid empirical studies available at the moment find no 
improvement in student performance, and sometimes even a deterioration. In these studies, the 
effects are found by comparing the performance of students who use ICT to the performance of 
students in a proper control group. The control group is established by design in an 
experimental setup or by coincidence (Angrist and Lavy, 2002; Goolsbee and Guryan, 2005; 
Rouse and Krueger, 2004; Leuven et al., 2005). A fifth recent study does find an improvement 
in student performance after ICT investments in schools (Machin, MacNally and Silva, 2006). 
The fact that, so far, few convincing results of ICT investments have been found may partly be 
because schools and teachers still have to learn how to apply the new technology usefully. 
 
Finally, empirical evidence points to the importance of the possibility for parents to choose the 
school for their children and of the centralized administering of tests and exams. These 
elements already exist for a long time in Dutch primary and secondary education. Abolishing or 
reducing them may well harm welfare. For instance, forcing parents to send their children to a 
school in their own neighbourhood (based on zip codes) may well have unintended side effects. 
In the US and the UK, housing prices rose in districts where schools received positive 
evaluations by the education inspectorate or similar institutions (Figlio and Lucas, 2004; 
Machin and Gibbons, 2001). Parents with sufficient wealth are able to move to those areas. The 
limiting of school choice to one’s neighbourhood is in this case undone parents’ ability to 
choose the neighbourhood.   
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The importance of central tests and exams is shown in research for the US and the UK. 
Student performance is higher in school systems that use central testing (Bishop, 1997; 
Woesman, 2003). 
 
5  Potentially successful research and innovation policy 
Research and innovation are important sources of prosperity. Can additional government policy 
in the areas of research and innovation raise welfare? The answer is also here: yes. Empirical 
evidence shows that at the current level of policy, additional R&D investment still has a high 
social return. Estimates of the social return of additional R&D are around 50% to 100% above 
the private rate of return. However, empirical evidence also shows that it is difficult to design 
policy that actually raises R&D investment. R&D subsidies, for instance, often turn out to also 
finance projects that would have been carried out by the private sector anyway. 
 
In light of this role for the government, we judge the potential for success of a number of policy 
options in the areas of research and innovation. This judgement is based on empirical research, 
especially solid empirical research with proper control groups. 
 
A first potentially successful policy option is an expansion of the provisions for starting 
innovating companies within the so-called Law Promoting Research and Development (in 
Dutch: Wet Bevordering Speur- en Ontwikkelingswerk (WBSO)). These provisions allow 
innovative start-ups a deduction in wage taxes and premiums for R&D employees. Empirical 
research finds that one euro spent by the government on this provision generates between 50 
and 80 cents of additional R&D employment (Cornet and Vroomen, 2005). This study uses a 
circumstance that closely resembles an experiment. Combined with the high social return to 
R&D, this research result makes it plausible that this policy option raises welfare. 
The judgement about a limited general expansion of the Law Promoting Research and 
Development is neutral. Empirical research indicates that the law in its current scale has a 
positive effect on welfare. So, abolishing the law would reduce welfare. However, the empirics 
on the effects of limited expansion are too uncertain to call. There is no available evidence at all 
on the effects of a substantial expansion. 
 
A second potentially successful policy option is an expansion of public support for funds that 
supply small amounts of venture capital loans. Studies indicate that the capital market for this 
type of loans is too thin from a social point of view. Empirical studies in the UK show that 
government policy can improve the functioning of this market (DTI, 1999). Two important  
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components of such a policy are that private investors decide whether a company receives a 
loan and that these private investors share in the risk (Boot and Schmeits, 2004). 
 
A third potentially successful policy option is easier access to the Netherlands for well educated 
foreigners. These foreigners bring substantial knowledge capital along with them. This 
knowledge capital also has a radiating effect on other people and firms that can learn from these 
well educated. Studies show that these radiating effects are to a large extent local. Short 
distances are important to benefit from other people’s knowledge. Earlier experiences with 
opening up the Dutch labour market to foreigners indicate how this policy may be implemented. 
 
A fourth potentially successful policy option is to make government funding of university 
research more conditional on research performance. It concerns the so-called first flow of 
money, in Dutch: de eerste geldstroom. About 40% of this government funding is currently 
allocated according to fixed shares, without a direct connection to research performance. 
Experiences in the UK with the Research Assessment Exercise indicate that strengthening the 
research performance incentives for universities leads to a rise in the quantity and quality of 
research output and to a concentration of research funds at the best research universities. 
 
The effects of a recent initiative to give innovation vouchers to firms is still unknown. These 
vouchers can be used by small and medium-sized enterprises to pay for a research project 
performed by public research institutions, such as universities and TNO. The vouchers were 
randomly handed out to a number of firms, so the policy had the form of an experiment. 
Empirical research shows that the innovation vouches indeed lead to more research orders 
placed at the research institutions. 80% of the vouchers lead to orders that would not been 
placed without the voucher (Cornet et al., 2005). However, it is still unknown whether these 
research orders in turn lead to the ultimate goal: more innovation by small and medium 
enterprises. An evaluation of this issue will be conducted in the fall of 2006. 
 
There is a range of policies with the general verdict ‘effect unknown’ that try to stimulate 
research and innovation in specific areas of economic activity, rather than in general. Examples 
are policies aimed at stimulating a specific technology, a specific industry or a specific 
geographical region. The empirical literature does not provide much evidence one way or the 
other to determine whether such policies are potentially successful. Solid evaluation studies are 
lacking. Case studies can tell us how the area of the economy supported by policy has 
developed - with examples ranging all the way from rapid growth to complete collapse - but do 
not make a hard case for a causal link between this development and the policy involved. 
Theory does provide some guidelines to policy makers for making good choices, both with 
regards to the selection process and to the distinguishing characteristics that make an economic  
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activity a likely candidate for socially beneficial public support. The selection process should be 
open and transparent, with independent experts selecting the areas to be supported based on the 
expected contribution to welfare. An example of a distinguishing characteristic is the 
impossibility to keep certain innovations a secret or to patent them, which undermines the 
incentive for firms to invest in these innovations.  
Empirical research does not provide evidence as to whether these guidelines are sufficient to 
enable policy makers to properly select areas of economic activity to be supported. In addition, 
the possible advantages of making good selections need to be weighed against the costs. These 
costs include the direct cost of the public support, such the amount of money spent in the from 
of subsidies, and the indirect cost such as the cost of organising, supervising and monitoring the 
selection process, the direct and indirect costs of possible lobbying and the costs of economic 
inefficiencies induced by raising additional tax money. 
 
Finally, the literature provides guidelines for two other aspects of research and innovation 
policy. The first deals with the relationship between these policies and the government budget 
policy. The literature indicates that government support should be based solely on the merits of 
the project to be supported, not on the availability of funds in the budget. Choosing the latter as 
a criterion leads to the risk that projects that are unlikely to be beneficial are funded anyway, 
because of an excess of funds, or that projects that are potentially successful are not funded, 
because of a shortage of funds. 
The second aspect concerns the relationship between research and innovation policy and 
employment. Successful research and innovation policy raises the quality of jobs. In the long 
run, there is, however, no effect on the quantity of jobs. The additional employment generated 
by a specific project replaces employment elsewhere in the economy. Empirical research shows 
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